Re: [TLS] MITM Attacks on Client Authentication after Resumption

["Salz, Rich" <[e-mail]>]

> both of which were previously noticed in 2009 with the Rex/Ray attack.

Hmm…  Four-plus years is a pretty darn good record, I’d say.

> why users should continue to trust TLS with confidential information.

At the risk of being flip or snarky, because it’s the only thing we have. Therefore everyone uses it and therefore there are lots more “interesting” places for an adversary to attack.  As the old joke goes, I don’t have to outrun the bear, I just have to outrun you.

At one point, the most common way banks transferred money amongst themselves was PGP signed data over FTP. I don’t know if it’s still true. The US Federal Reserve requires TLS over direct leased lines for banks doing transactions more than $10Million.

> Username password and cookies continue to be widely used in part because client authentication in TLS has not had a good run.

You mean because client certs are not widely deployed, right?  Perhaps some name/pbkdf2 is better?
                /r$

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Principal Security Engineer
Akamai Technology
Cambridge, MA