Re: [TLS] MITM Attacks on Client Authentication after Resumption

Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Mon, 03 March 2014 17:07 UTC

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From: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2014 12:06:45 -0500
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To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] MITM Attacks on Client Authentication after Resumption
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On Mon, Mar 3, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Martin Thomson
<martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrote:
> This would prevent the use of false start, would it not?

I don't believe so, unless I've missed something. This doesn't delay
the master-secret's availability and so I don't see that it would
impact False Start.


Cheers

AGL