Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0

[Geoffrey Keating <[e-mail]>]

[e-mail] (Martin Rex) writes:

> To me, the second sentence of Appendix F:
> 
>    This document makes several traditional assumptions, including that
>    attackers have substantial computational resources and cannot obtain
>    secret information from sources outside the protocol.
> 
> says pretty clearly that TLS is not designed to provide protection from
> an attacker who can gain almost full control over one of the communication
> endpoints and can exploit this to get data of his own liking and data
> that the attacker would like to discover mixed according to the attackers
> choice with attacker supplied data and sent over the very same TLS-protected
> communication channel.

Surely one traditional assumption is that an attacker can create
messages of his own and get them inserted into the stream?  Including
the possibility of intentionally causing a lot of traffic?

I'm fairly sure that one of the tactics used in WW2 to get 'cribs' to
break ENIGMA was to intentionally do things that would cause the enemy
to send a message with known contents, like sending an apparently
valuable target within vision of a U-boat that could not attack it, in
the hope the U-boat would report.