Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0
Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Wed, 29 October 2014 10:44 UTC
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 11:43:58 +0100
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Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0
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On Tuesday 28 October 2014 12:19:48 Florian Weimer wrote: > * Yuhong Bao: > > I hope that a Internet-Draft prohibiting SSL 3.0 will be next. > > RFC 6101 already has status “HISTORIC”. I'm not sure what else the > IETF can do. The cryptographically protected version negotation means > that there is no actual harm in supporting SSL 3.0 along with TLS. > (Same for supporting earlier TLS versions.) Even the TLS 1.3 draft says that a client SHOULD NOT send a SSLv2 compatible client hello with server support being stated as MAY. Similarly, the value for SSL 3.0 for record layer in client hello is mentioned as the backwards compatible option with no mention of recommendation against it. I'd say an RFC that updates them to a MUST NOT/SHOULD NOT (respectively for SSLv2 and SSLv3, at the very least) is not entirely out of scope... -- Regards, Hubert Kario
- [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Yuhong Bao
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Florian Weimer
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Florian Weimer
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Geoffrey Keating
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Sean Turner
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Joseph Salowey
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Yuhong Bao
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] Prohibiting SSL 3.0 Yoav Nir