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Re: [TLS] datacenter TLS decryption as a three-party protocol

"Paul Turner" <pturner@equio.com> Mon, 24 July 2017 14:33 UTC

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From: Paul Turner <pturner@equio.com>
To: 'Kyle Rose' <krose@krose.org>, 'Brian Sniffen' <bsniffen@akamai.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
References: <CAAF6GDeFuRy0DN6w3FwmR_nh1G=YBi4+qiEcw0MfSRj4SUCbZQ@mail.gmail.com> <20170720200114.AA2F91A6CB@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp> <06AE85BC-87AD-4CA5-8408-44F670358701@ll.mit.edu> <20170720203238.e66zurx5yn2jja3a@LK-Perkele-VII> <17109486-336E-44C0-B9FC-D65EE14310B5@ll.mit.edu> <20170723070240.x7kmynzmu4jqco5t@LK-Perkele-VII> <C0772D29-CB26-418F-981B-BC2E2435E655@ll.mit.edu> <35FD3356-8300-405A-B8D8-FC2574DB9A56@fugue.com> <CE89217F-972F-4F37-B8BA-925AE1FE8D68@ll.mit.edu> <44105D6B-4CE0-4C3C-ACFA-30EF1D8AA8F7@fugue.com> <C76720C5-7BB6-4AB4-8A2D-7569EC57D15D@ll.mit.edu> <388DA0F2-E3FC-47D2-B97C-D244ACE50E61@fugue.com> <m2o9sarky7.fsf@bos-mpeve.kendall.corp.akamai.com> <CAJU8_nXxKb6Ros+amCUSdvxQHPj3V_E75c4hxRkBRrD1z7WyGg@mail.gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 10:33:14 -0400
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/2m7HKx46pUDCihtAMwMgyvWPXOs>
Subject: Re: [TLS] datacenter TLS decryption as a three-party protocol
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Of course, this is precisely the point. All your proposal does is complicate the process of sharing sessions with a third-party: it doesn't stop an endpoint from surreptitiously doing evil.

 

Is the objective to have the protocol prevent an endpoint “surreptitiously doing evil”? Also, can you define what you mean by evil?

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