Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0
mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Thu, 23 May 2013 00:51 UTC
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 02:51:45 +0200
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From: mrex@sap.com
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0
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Eric Rescorla wrote: > Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote: > > > > Paterson, Kenny wrote: > > > > > > True. Though the spec for DTLS does allow DTLS implementations to > > > terminate a connection in the event of errors. > > > > > > It's just that most (all?) implementations don't. > > > > Now that you mention it, I hadn't noticed that DTLS gives actual two > > _different_ guidances (MAY abort on MAC error and MUST discard records > > with MAC error are mutually exclusive) > > > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4347#section-4.1.2.1 > > > > 4.1.2.1 MAC (last paragraph): > > > > In general, DTLS implementations SHOULD silently discard data with > > bad MACs. If a DTLS implementation chooses to generate an alert when > > it receives a message with an invalid MAC, it MUST generate > > bad_record_mac alert with level fatal and terminate its connection > > state. > > > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4347#section-4.1.2.5 > > > > 4.1.2.5 Anti-replay (last paragraph): > > > > If the received record falls within the window and is new, or if the > > packet is to the right of the window, then the receiver proceeds to > > MAC verification. If the MAC validation fails, the receiver MUST > > discard the received record as invalid. The receive window is > > updated only if the MAC verification succeeds. > > > > Hmm.... I'm not sure these are contradictory. > > If you get a packet with a MAC error you MUST discard the packet (i.e., > not process it.) You may either *silently* discard it (i.e.., proceed as if > you had not received it) or terminate the connection with an alert. Silently discarding it = proceed as if you had not received it non-silently discarding it = log an error and proceed as if you had not not received it Terminating the connection with an alert means "processing it". So yes, there is a contradiction. -Martin
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Paul Duffy
- [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Ulrich Herberg
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Robert Cragie
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 David McGrew (mcgrew)
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Ulrich Herberg
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Xiaoyong Wu
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Ulrich Herberg
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Ulrich Herberg
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Geoffrey Keating
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Kemp, David P.
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Simon Josefsson