Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3: Deterministic RSA-PSS and ECDSA

Hanno Böck <> Sun, 07 August 2016 06:57 UTC

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Date: Sat, 6 Aug 2016 23:57:16 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3: Deterministic RSA-PSS and ECDSA
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On Sat, 6 Aug 2016 18:54:56 -1000
Brian Smith <> wrote:

> Also, I think it would be great if people working on proofs of
> security for TLS could take into consideration the fact that
> some--perhaps many--implementations will intentionally or accidentally
> use some form of deterministic or less-than-random salt generation for
> RSA-PSS. For example, it would be great to see a "What if the salt(s)
> in the RSA PSS signature(s) were generated deterministically?" section
> of papers describing such proofs.

Actually there is some info on that in the PSS spec [1]. What I write
here is my limited understanding, but roughly I'd interpret it as this:
It says that if you use a non-random salt the security gets reduced to
the security of full domain hashing, which was kinda the predecessor of
I'd conclude from that that even in a situation where the salt
generation is a non-random value nothing really bad happens. The
security of a PSS scheme without randomness is still better than that
of a PKCS #1 1.5 signature.

Maybe some more knowledgable people want to add something, but the
bottom line is I think that we don't need to worry too much about the
randomness part here. Unlike with other situations (e.g. ecdsa/dsa) the
randomness is not a piece that once you take it away everything blows


Hanno Böck