Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3: Deterministic RSA-PSS and ECDSA

Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Mon, 08 August 2016 20:21 UTC

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2016 13:21:13 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3: Deterministic RSA-PSS and ECDSA
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On Monday, August 8, 2016, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>
> The urban myth about the advantages of the RSA-PSS signature scheme
> over PKCS#1 v1.5 keep coming up.
>

Do you think we'll see real-world MitM attacks against RSA-PSS in TLS
similar to those we've seen with PKCS#1v1.5 signature forgery, such as
BERserk?