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Re: [TLS] PSK in 1.3?

Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@polarssl.org> Mon, 20 October 2014 18:15 UTC

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Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:15:22 +0200
From: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@polarssl.org>
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To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PSK in 1.3?
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On 20/10/2014 19:06, Dan Harkins wrote:
>   Merely making the pool from which the PSK is drawn, for instance
> by making it a bigger or including mixed case

PS: the above reference to "mixed case" makes me think there is a serious
misunderstanding about how keys should be generated. They should be the output
of a properly seeded cryptographically secure DRBG. The very notion of "mixed
case" does not make any sense in this context.

If such misinterpretations can be made, then indeed the RFC should be revised to
be much more explicit about the meaning of pre-shared *key* (as opposed to
password).

Manuel.

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