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Re: [TLS] PSK in 1.3?

Mohamad Badra <mbadra@gmail.com> Mon, 20 October 2014 20:44 UTC

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Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 00:44:05 +0400
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From: Mohamad Badra <mbadra@gmail.com>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Cc: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@polarssl.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] PSK in 1.3?
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>
>
>   The justification for these ciphersuites is some constrained device that
> has a small data and code size. But if you can not only generate 128-bit
> long uniformly random keys from a good source of entropy and also
> securely provision them on 2 (or more) devices then you don't need TLS.
> Just do static keyed symmetric crypto and you save even more data
> and code by eliminating TLS!
>
>   In practice, these things are deployed by people who probably do not
> read the RFC in question, are in a hurry, and don't understand the
> security implications of their use of TLS. The PSKs that get provisioned
> are the ones that are easy to enter with a low probability of error-- i.e.
> something considerably less than uniformly random 128-bit key
> generated from a good source of entropy.
>
>   This is not (only) a theoretical issue. It's practical reality.
>
>
Any link to sources that support this practical reality? Or it is a
theoretical statement?

Best regards
Badra

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