Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: TLS 1.3 Authentication and Integrity only Cipher Suites

Hi,

I agree with Bill.  Keeping confidentiality in all TLS/1.3 connections is
future proofing.
Supposedly analyzing and then leaving confidentiality out invites future
attacks.

Cheers,
- Ira

On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 9:56 AM Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com> wrote:

> On 2/11/21 at 9:01 PM, rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org (Salz,
> Rich) wrote:
>
> >>I would just like to recognize that there are some situations where it
> isn't needed.
> >
> >Can you explain why TLS 1.2 isn't good enough for your needs?
>
> In my experience, there are many attacks that aren't anticipated
> by the designers, but are successful. How can anyone know that
> you don't need privacy?
>
> Back in the dark ages, I was working with a protocol which
> provided the same basic assurances as TLS does: confidentiality,
> authentication, and integrity. It and TlS also provide some
> other important assurances, such a one-time, in order delivery,
> which we also depended on. When we looked at a similar protocol
> which didn't provide confidentiality, we discovered that there
> was application level data that needed to be kept secret or the
> application's assurances would be violated.
>
> In all honesty, it's probably cheaper to just provide
> confidentiality than it is to do the analysis and protocol
> proofs to show you don't need it.
>
> Cheers - Bill
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> Bill Frantz        | There are now so many exceptions to the
> 408-348-7900       | Fourth Amendment that it operates only by
> www.pwpconsult.com | accident.  -  William Hugh Murray
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