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Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme

Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Fri, 02 September 2016 19:21 UTC

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 02 Sep 2016 21:21:00 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Friday, 2 September 2016 21:38:33 CEST Yoav Nir wrote:
> > On 2 Sep 2016, at 8:27 PM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > 
> > On Friday, 2 September 2016 12:06:55 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> >> On 09/02/2016 12:04 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com
> >>> 
> >>> <mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>>    On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
> >>>> 
> >>>    <ilariliusvaara@welho.com <mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com>> wrote:
> >>>>> I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of
> >>>>> being
> >>>>> its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to
> >>>>> 
> >>>    get the
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> needed registrations: informative RFC would do).
> >>>> 
> >>>> I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason
> >>>> 
> >>>    we defined SHA-2 in
> >>>> 
> >>>> a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had
> >>>> 
> >>>    to make significant
> >>>> 
> >>>> changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to
> >>>> 
> >>>    be that case.
> >>>    
> >>>    I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think
> >>>    it's a good idea given that we'll need to do it eventually
> >>> 
> >>> I'm not sure that that's true.
> >> 
> >> Predicting future needs is not always reliable, yes.
> >> 
> >>> From a release-engineering (standards-engineering?) perspective, I still
> >> 
> >> don't see any reasons to add it now, and do see reasons to not add it
> >> now.
> > 
> > what would be the reasons not to add it now?
> 
> Several reasons:
>  - This is a core spec. Those don’t traditionally specify new algorithms
> unless they’re MTI (like SHA-256 is TLS 1.2 and RSAPSS here) 
> - For now,
> SHA-3 is yet another national algorithm. Why add this and not Streebog? [1]
> - Who’s to tell whether SHA-2 breaks earlier than SHA-3?

But then we have:
* AES and ChaCha (two modes for the former one even)
* RSA and ECDSA
* NIST curves and Bernstein curves
* ECDHE key exchange an DHE key exchange

only the SHA-2 stands alone...

-- 
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic

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