Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor
Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org> Mon, 31 March 2014 16:22 UTC
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From: Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org>
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Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2014 12:22:25 -0400
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References: <CACsn0cmOjLDVgHjN00vb7XVTEU2FS9ZP5Rdax1W7sUqVBPQdvA@mail.gmail.com> <53397B6F.9050806@mykolab.com> <CAL9PXLzuwKCZ2MhLUMviTW-aV19Zm-m=4mVEcmKkFUtHm6sPKQ@mail.gmail.com> <53397E0C.9000504@mykolab.com> <CA+cU71mbBs_ER31abZ1nP1FtVAwREMvRwpPmcLaSYZiXhqUPGg@mail.gmail.com> <53397F7C.2060603@mykolab.com> <53398AB3.9090102@gmail.com> <CAGZ8ZG0sd+K2jCmA0KeH55dPG6Y+WHm7LDyhosFjY5R7ekp5GQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor
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Hi all, I can't speak to anyone's intentions, but note that these aren't the only I-Ds that add more randomness. As described in our paper, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-tls-additional-random-ext-01> is quite similar. The idea of adding more random bits seems to have been fairly popular in the 2006-2010 timeframe. There may be more proposals to do this, for example using <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6358>, that I missed. S On Mar 31, 2014, at 12:06 PM, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> wrote: > Hi Rene, > > The revelation that NSA used this Working Group in an attempt to > promote TLS extensions which amplify the backdoor is new: > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input/ > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rescorla-tls-extended-random/ > > > Trevor > > > On Mon, Mar 31, 2014 at 8:33 AM, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com> wrote: >> Dear colleagues: >> >> Not sure what is new here. The paper (with an impressive list of nine (!) >> co-authors) seems to be simply a validation of results already described in >> the Crypto 2007 rump session paper by Ferguson et al and in the teachings of >> a 2005 US patent application. >> >> Best regards, Rene >> >> >> >> On 3/31/2014 10:45 AM, Paul Ferguson wrote: >>> >>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >>> Hash: SHA256 >>> >>> On 3/31/2014 7:40 AM, Tom Ritter wrote: >>> >>>> Looks like this has the technical details: http://dualec.org/ >>>> >>> Gracias. >>> >>> - - ferg >>> >>>> -tom >>>> >>>> >>> >>> - -- Paul Ferguson >>> VP Threat Intelligence, IID >>> PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2 >>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >>> Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) >>> Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ >>> >>> iF4EAREIAAYFAlM5f3wACgkQKJasdVTchbKYNgEAiwR5zR2qfSRfdEkXQx7CihyY >>> QD3xZG9bkx8+40Gc+BYA/Avz/59WC1sv8KodlV4Z81rJqMF8uKrrxn2A6SR80lgC >>> =NxYj >>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> TLS mailing list >>> TLS@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> >> >> >> -- >> email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik >> cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363 >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > -- Stephen Checkoway
- [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Paul Ferguson
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Stephen Checkoway
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Paul Ferguson
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Tom Ritter
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Paul Ferguson
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Rene Struik
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Trevor Perrin
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Stephen Checkoway
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor =JeffH
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor Bodo Moeller