Re: [TLS] Question on Stateless TLS Session Resumption

Lakshminath Dondeti <ldondeti@qualcomm.com> Sun, 14 January 2007 16:55 UTC

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Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2007 08:54:11 -0800
From: Lakshminath Dondeti <ldondeti@qualcomm.com>
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To: EKR <ekr@networkresonance.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Question on Stateless TLS Session Resumption
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Thanks Eric.  I guess in my quick scan of your paper, I missed the 
"ticket" as the "session ID" aspect.  In fact, hashing of the ticket as 
a substitute for session ID was what I was thinking about as the "extra" 
computation.   Now the paper does talk about hashing the session ID, 
which makes sense now :).

cheers,
Lakshminath

Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Lakshminath Dondeti <ldondeti@qualcomm.com> writes:
>>> However, as you indicate, you might want to explicitly terminate
>>> a session. As Vidya indicated, this requires server side state,
>>> though less than a session cache would require.
>> Right, this is what I was pointing out as "difficult" (for some degree
>> of difficulty :) ).  Either we need more state or more state plus some
>> more computation to invalidate a ticket (I am thinking a hash
>> computation), if the identity (session id) is not fixed. 
> 
> Actually, the existence of the session ID doesn't change matters
> much at all. Whatever operations you would follow with the
> session ID you follow with the ticket. 
> 
> 
>> Yes, I took
>> a quick at the relevant portions of the paper you cite, but that
>> analysis assumes that there is a session id and assumes that the
>> server has a blacklist of invalidated sessions.
> 
> RFC 4507 has both a ticket and a session ID. BSR04 uses the
> ticket as the session ID.
> 
> -Ekr
> 

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