Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 draft

Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk> Tue, 06 March 2007 17:59 UTC

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Date: Tue, 06 Mar 2007 18:00:14 +0000
From: Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 draft
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Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> What I'm saying is that the recommendation to prevent his attack
> is to use an RSA_DHE ciphersuite and use a fresh DH ephemeral
> with each key exchange. This provides the same security at
> a substantially superior performance level.
> 

On the subject of DHE and performance... should we allow a server to
optionally send the subprime ("q") value in ServerKeyExchange?

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Freelance consultant see: http://www.drh-consultancy.co.uk/
Email: shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk, PGP key: via homepage.

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