Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms

[Nico Williams <[e-mail]>]

On Apr 4, 2014 8:36 PM, "Watson Ladd" <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 1: How will DANE make this worse?
> 2: Is this really the best we can do? What features of X509 led to
> these problems?

Let's take #2 first.  Here's two entrants:

- x.509 naming is impossibly difficult to deal with (see RFC4514);

- stapled OCSP is how it should have been from day one -- CRLs add a ton of
complexity

Back to #1:  DNSSEC is a PKI, but with better naming and fewer root CAs.
We're going to need CT for DNSSEC.

> 3: This focused on server authentication. How does client authentication
fare?

Very differently.  For user authentication I think something more like
Persona (still PK, but not Internet-scale PKI) is better.  We really need a
standard account & device enrollment protocol to make user PK work well --
then we can land wherever on the PKI..web-of-trust..ad-hoc spectrum the
market likes best.

Nico
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