Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms

[Yan Zhu <[e-mail]>]

On 04/04/2014 06:35 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Dear all,
> https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak14.pdf contains tests of
> many TLS implementations. Interestingly all tested implementations
> contain errors, and all but OpenSSL erroneous accepts. Cryptlib was
> not tested, because it doesn't validate certificates.
> 
> At the core of these issues is the complexity of certificate
> validation. Things for this committee to consider:
> 
> 1: How will DANE make this worse?
> 2: Is this really the best we can do? What features of X509 led to
> these problems?
> 3: This focused on server authentication. How does client authentication fare?

In case anyone wants to investigate these questions, the code used in
that study to generate mutated certificates is at
https://github.com/sumanj/frankencert. (You will need a corpus of
certificates to start from; the mirrors of EFF's SSL Observatory scan
results seem to all be unavailable at the moment, but that should be
fixed soon.)

-Yan

> 4: Did this actually cover everything?
> 
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> 
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-- 
Yan Zhu  <[e-mail]>
Staff Technologist
Electronic Frontier Foundation                  https://www.eff.org
815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA  94109       [phone] x134