Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms
mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Tue, 08 April 2014 17:06 UTC
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 08 Apr 2014 19:06:10 +0200
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From: mrex@sap.com
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms
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Watson Ladd wrote: > "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote: >> >> PKIX deals with the black box called "certificate >> path validation" (within which EKU-processing is defined), and with >> requirements for "conforming CAs" which issue X.509v3 certs (of which >> there seem to exist very few, if any, considering how much junk >> X.509v3 certificates are floating around. >> >> Could it be that GoDaddy is issuing Server certs that aren't valid >> ASN.1 DER ? >> >> Their ASN.1 DER encoder doesn't seen to implement "BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE" >> correctly: >> >> BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { >> cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, >> pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } >> > > Well, are they? Short of a hex dump of a GoDaddy certificate+chapter and > verse of X509 I don't know how we are supposed to evaluate your claim. openssl asn1dump for Server cert from https://www.verisign.com/ 1087:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE 1089:d=5 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Basic Constraints 1094:d=5 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:3000 openssl asn1dump for Server cert from https://www.godaddy.com/ 784:d=4 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SEQUENCE 786:d=5 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Basic Constraints 791:d=5 hl=2 l= 1 prim: BOOLEAN :255 794:d=5 hl=2 l= 5 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:3003010100 801:d=4 hl=2 l= 29 cons: SEQUENCE 803:d=5 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Extended Key Usage 808:d=5 hl=2 l= 22 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:301406082B060105050703 0106082B06010505070302 The godaddy ASN.1 DER encoding problem might be specific to the BasicConstraints extension. The criticality Boolean is correctly omitted in their non-critical ExtendedKeyUsage encoding, but not within the BasicConstraints extension. -Martin
- [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Yan Zhu
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Kemp, David P.
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Rob Stradling
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [TLS] Certificate validation can of worms Santosh Chokhani