Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for SSLKEYLOG File

[Martin Thomson <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, Mar 13, 2024, at 08:39, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> (Apologies to Martin for the grudging acceptance of
> his worthy effort;-)

No apology needed.  Nose-holding is expected :)

> Sorry also for a late suggestion, but how'd we feel about adding
> some text like this to 1.1?
>
>     "An implementation, esp. a server, emitting a log file such
>      as this in a production environment where the TLS clients are
>      unaware that logging is happening, could fall afoul of regulatory
>      requirements to protect client data using state-of-the-art
>      mechanisms."

I agree with Ekr.  That risk is not appreciably changed by the existence of a definition for a file format.  And we do better keeping to the technical implications of choices.

> Another thought occurred to me that I don't recall being mentioned
> before: given we're defining a mime type, that suggests sending
> these files by mail or in an HTTP response. Doing that could
> be leaky, [...]

I see equal opportunity for good things (detecting keylogfiles, deleting them, generating a warning), than bad as a result of writing this down.  See also RFC 8959 (which the IETF did not publish, which I concede undermines my position somewhat...)