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Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for SSLKEYLOG File

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 12 March 2024 22:52 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2024 15:52:15 -0700
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for SSLKEYLOG File
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On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 3:45 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
>
> On 12/03/2024 22:06, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > I don't think we should make statements about regulatory requirements
> > in this kind of specification. That's not our lane.
>
> I'd weakly disagree about making statements such as suggested,
> while agreeing with "not out lane." I don't think the text I
> suggested crosses that line, but it's fine if others disagree
> of course.
>

> I'd also be ok if we only stated that emitting these logs in
> production systems means not deploying state of the art security
> and letting the rest of the world connect the dots.
>

Lots of things don't constitute not deploying state of the art security,
including, arguable, not using PQ algorithms.

I think we should be very clear about the technical consequences of
implementing this specification in the Security Considerations (which I
think they are) but that either this statement or the one you previously
proposed is not helpful.
-Ekr


>
> Cheers,
> S.
>
> PS: to be clear, I'm not objecting to progression if my
> suggestion isn't adopted.
>

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