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Re: [TLS] Question to TLS 1.3 and certificate revocation checks in long lasting connections

Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> Mon, 08 March 2021 03:32 UTC

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Date: Sun, 07 Mar 2021 19:31:24 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Question to TLS 1.3 and certificate revocation checks in long lasting connections
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Hi Peter,

Just to confirm: the scenario you're using to contrast to the one described
by Viktor (and Nico) is a scenarios in which the certificates expire at "never"
(99991231235959Z)?

I think that at least some people are contrasting against something other
than that...

Thanks,

Ben

On Mon, Mar 08, 2021 at 03:21:22AM +0000, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> writes:
> 
> >But if the signal is not ignored, and proper automation is applied,
> >reliability actually improves.
> 
> No, it drops.  You're going from a situation where you've eliminated any
> chances of outages due to expired certs to one where you get to play Russian
> roulette every single day: Will the cert renewal work, or will it fail for
> some reason?  Let's spin the cylinder and see if this is the day our grid goes
> down.
> 
> Even if you somehow create a 100% successful magical process for replacing
> certs that never ever fails, you're now introduced another possible failure
> situation, with certs changing constantly there's a chance that something that
> relies on them can't handle a new cert, for example because an issuing CA has
> renewed as well or something similar.
> 
> It's just building in more and more opportunities for failure from a mechanism
> that's supposed to be making your infrastructure more robust, not less.
> 
> Peter.
> 
> 
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