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Re: [TLS] Question to TLS 1.3 and certificate revocation checks in long lasting connections

"Olle E. Johansson" <oej@edvina.net> Mon, 08 March 2021 08:15 UTC

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From: "Olle E. Johansson" <oej@edvina.net>
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Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2021 09:15:43 +0100
Cc: Olle E Johansson <oej@edvina.net>, Graham Bartlett <graham.ietf@gmail.com>, "Cooley, Dorothy E" <decoole@nsa.gov>, John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Question to TLS 1.3 and certificate revocation checks in long lasting connections
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> On 7 Mar 2021, at 17:25, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Mar 07, 2021 at 12:15:24PM +0000, Graham Bartlett wrote:
>> 
>> I would imagine that the implementation would pull the session down once
>> the certificate expires, so the session only lasts for the lifetime of the
>> certificate.
> 
> Many people expect this, but I don't think there's universal agreement
> that it's the right behavior.  The divide between authentication and
> authorization that (IIRC) Viktor called out is relevant here -- the
> initial key exchange and, to large extent, authentication, do not suddenly
> become invalid upon credential expiry, but any authorization derived from
> the credential might.  So it seems that whether the session should terminate
> at the certificate expiry time is rather dependent on what the session is
> being used for.

Maybe there’s a need for a BCP here. It is unclear to me how to apply these
discussions to SIP and we have a few points worth noting from this dicussion.

- Describe the dependencies in Benjamins statement above and how
  they apply to protocols
- Open a new session before deciding to close the old one
- Application timers to cert expiry

Seems like something for UTA to me.

/O

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