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Re: [TLS] Question to TLS 1.3 and certificate revocation checks in long lasting connections

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Sat, 06 March 2021 21:12 UTC

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Date: Sat, 06 Mar 2021 15:12:44 -0600
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Question to TLS 1.3 and certificate revocation checks in long lasting connections
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On Sat, Mar 06, 2021 at 01:21:14AM -0500, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> I suspect that in at least some cases the motivation to revalidate the
> server certificate is only requested because it could be done in
> principle, and ticks some checkbox about using CRLs, because they
> exist, rather than from a clear threat this addresses.

I agree.  There's no need.

> However, it is possible that there actually exist use-cases where this
> makes some sense, and that case, If connection lifetimes would otherwise
> last unacceptably long, make a new connection, and close the old (in
> some appropriate order).

Yeah, but then, in 2021 BGP still depends on long-lived connections...

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