Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - some issues related to PKCS11

[Michael StJohns <[e-mail]>]

On 9/17/2013 8:57 AM, Pascal Urien wrote:
> Why don't you realize a TLS stack in a secure element ?. For both full 
> and resume mode , in order to protect the master secret
> see 
> http://www.ethertrust.com/wp-content/themes/ethertrust/about_ethertrust.pdf
> Pascal

This is a valid solution, but doesn't actually match what PKCS11 is 
designed to do - e.g. provide generic access to cryptographic functions, 
rather than build the TLS stack inside the token.

Also, the above doesn't provide any support for TLS key material 
exporters. (And wasn't that a problem to solve with PKCS11 safely).

The nice thing about PKCS11 is that its a toolkit that can be used for a 
lot of things - not just TLS.

Mike


>
>
> 2013/9/17 Martin Rex <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>
>
>     I fail to understand what you're trying to protect.
>
>     The master secret of a session is never a secret that is hidding
>     within the hardware module, instead, it is something known to the
>     calling TLS protocol stack and part of the TLS session cache.
>
>     For vanilla RSA cipher suites, it is deterministically derived
>     from randomness generated by the client and conveyed under
>     RSA encryption, deterministically combined with data known
>     in plain to the TLS protocol stack.
>
>     -Martin
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