Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - some issues related to PKCS11
mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Tue, 17 September 2013 16:14 UTC
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To: Michael StJohns <msj@nthpermutation.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 18:14:48 +0200
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From: mrex@sap.com
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - some issues related to PKCS11
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Michael StJohns wrote: > On 9/17/2013 8:49 AM, Martin Rex wrote: > > I fail to understand what you're trying to protect. > > > > The master secret of a session is never a secret that is hidding > > within the hardware module, instead, it is something known to the > > calling TLS protocol stack and part of the TLS session cache. > > Um. No, not if you designed things properly. It should be possible for > any protocol the IETF designs to do all the crypto operation inside a > hardware module and not depend on the weak security of a general purpose > computer. > > I want to protect inside of the HSM all of the following: > > a) the private keys related to the server or client identity > b) the pre-master key > c) the master key > d) the session keys. > > I want to be able to do all the cryptographic processing inside that > module and only allow out true plain text. > > > For vanilla RSA cipher suites, it is deterministically derived > > from randomness generated by the client and conveyed under > > RSA encryption, deterministically combined with data known > > in plain to the TLS protocol stack. > > I think you're talking about the pre-master secret? If so, yes, but > so? The encrypted pre-master secret goes to the HSM where it's > decrypted, run through a KDF and used to produce the master secret. > Ideally, that master secret may be retained within the HSM and protected > from disclosure. Typically, the PKCS#11 module will export an RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption primitive, and the server will typically be able to pass the encrypted premaster-secret, reference his strongly protected server credentials and obtain the RSA-decrypted output. Once that decrypted pre-master secret is obtained, everything else is deterministic. -Martin
- [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - some is… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Juraj Somorovsky
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Bill Frantz
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Juraj Somorovsky
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Juraj Somorovsky
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Juraj Somorovsky
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - som… Juraj Somorovsky