Re: [TLS] PR#345: IANA Considerations

Joe,

Can you clarify whether you believe consensus is to make the "Recommended"
list the list in the current PR or the MTI list. I can edit the document
either
way.

-Ekr

On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 11:05 AM, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> wrote:

> It looks like we have rough consensus to accept this PR. We can still have
> discussion on the naming of the categories.  We will also have to define
> the IANA registration policy for changing the "recommended" bit.   I'll
> open an issue for this,  I think changing the bit to recommended should
> require IETF consensus.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Joe
>
> On Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at 7:03 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>> >
>>> > There are presently four categories of cipher suites vis-a-vis TLS 1.3.
>>> >
>>> > 1. MUST or SHOULD cipher suites.
>>> > 2. Standards track cipher suites (or ones we are making ST, like
>>> >     the ECC ones).
>>> > 3. Non standards track cipher suites
>>> > 4. Cipher suites you can't use at all with TLS 1.3, like AES-CBC.
>>> >
>>> > I think we're all agreed that category #1 should be marked recommended
>>> > and that #3 and #4 should not be. This leaves us with category #2,
>>> which
>>> > includes stuff like:
>>> >
>>> > - FFDHE
>>> > - CCM
>>> >
>>> > My proposal is that we:
>>> >
>>> > - List all the Standards Track cipher suites that are compatible with
>>> TLS
>>> > 1.3 in Appendix A.
>>> > - Mark all the cipher suites that are listed in Appendix A as
>>> "Recommended"
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm slightly confused.
>>>
>>> rfc5288 is standards track and describes AES-GCM with static RSA keyex.
>>>
>>
>> This isn't compatible with TLS 1.3 because TLS 1.3 removes static RSA.
>>
>>
>> rfc5289 is only informational (i.e. _not_ standards track) and describes
>>> AES-GCM with ECDHE keyex.
>>
>>
>> We are re-labelling the AES-GCM ECDHE suites as standards track either in
>> this document or in RFC4492bis.
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -Martin
>>>
>>
>>
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>>
>