Re: [TLS] No more GMT exposure in the handshake

Jacob Appelbaum <> Sun, 08 June 2014 22:27 UTC

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Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2014 22:27:07 +0000
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From: Jacob Appelbaum <>
To: Bill Frantz <>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] No more GMT exposure in the handshake
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On 6/8/14, Bill Frantz <> wrote:
> On 6/8/14 at 3:17 AM, (Kurt Roeckx) wrote:
>>Anyway, how do you plan to deal with checking the status of the
>>certificate if you don't know what the current time is?
> It seems to be a poor policy to trust time information from a
> server whose certificate you are trying to validate.

Isn't it worse to trust a network protocol without any cryptographic
assurances at all? I think so... I also tend to think the right choice
is to fix NTP but we'll almost always have this first leap of
something. I'd prefer it not to be a mere leap of faith but rather a
leap of cryptographic assertion pinned to a set of keys that I trust.

Until the time that NTP is fixed to deal with hostile networks, we've
got hundreds of thousands of SSL/TLS servers on the internet that
serve mostly accurate time.

All the best,