Re: [TLS] Another IRINA bug in TLS

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 21 May 2015 10:32 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 21 May 2015 13:32:44 +0300
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References: <CACsn0ckaML0M_Foq9FXs5LA2dRb1jz+JDX7DUej_ZbuSkUB=tQ@mail.gmail.com> <1432141085848.37685@microsoft.com> <1432193344.3243.2.camel@redhat.com> <1432202373093.34978@microsoft.com> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73AB028124@uxcn10-tdc05.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> <op.xyzc65g63dfyax@killashandra.invalid.invalid> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73AB028164@uxcn10-tdc05.UoA.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Another IRINA bug in TLS
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> On May 21, 2015, at 1:16 PM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>; wrote:
> 
> Yngve N. Pettersen <yngve@spec-work.net>; writes:
> 
>> For reference, in my 530K sample (Biased towards Alexa top million sites)
>> there are 60000 servers (11.38%) that have that specific cipher suite
>> enabled, as of Monday this week.
> 
> Hmm, so what's the next escalation level beyond the previous "GIANT SCREAMING
> WTF”?  

If the website turned out to be a bank or an HMO?