Re: [TLS] Additional TLS 1.3 results from Chrome

David Wong <davidwong.crypto@gmail.com> Thu, 28 December 2017 08:54 UTC

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From: David Wong <davidwong.crypto@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2017 09:54:28 +0100
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Additional TLS 1.3 results from Chrome
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> I think we would like to avoid deliberately breaking these devices with TLS 1.3. (I think TLS 1.3 has been subject to enough friction already.)

I'm not sure I can agree with fixing TLS 1.3 so that it can work with
potentially backdoored devices. Isn't it the kind of friction we would
want?

David