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Re: [TLS] Additional TLS 1.3 results from Chrome

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 27 December 2017 15:02 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Dec 2017 07:01:30 -0800
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To: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Additional TLS 1.3 results from Chrome
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PR:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1128

I'll merge this next week, barring strong objection.

-Ekr


On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 8:28 AM, Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 5:07 AM, Stephen Farrell <
> stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
>> I'm not sure I agree renumbering is the right reaction,
>> though I don't object to that. This could be a case where
>> it's overall better that those specific devices suffer
>> breakage, and hopefully then do get firmware updated to
>> support TLS1.3 or TLS-without-extended-random-or-dual-ec
>> at some point.
>>
>
> I think we would like to avoid deliberately breaking these devices with
> TLS 1.3. (I think TLS 1.3 has been subject to enough friction already.)
>
> If key_share is renumbered, then presumably extension 40 would be reserved
> by IANA. Thus other implementations could send extension 40 if they wish
> not to interoperate with extended_random-supporting peers.
>
>
> Cheers
>
> AGL
>

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