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Re: [TLS] [pkix] New version of Multiple OCSP mode of Certificate

Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com> Thu, 05 August 2010 00:12 UTC

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Date: Wed, 04 Aug 2010 19:11:38 -0500
From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com>
To: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org, tmiller@mitre.org, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] [pkix] New version of Multiple OCSP mode of Certificate
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On Thu, Aug 05, 2010 at 01:07:22AM +0200, Martin Rex wrote:
> Yngve N. Pettersen wrote:
> > The kind of crafted URLs you are concerned about can also be injected by  
> > way of OCSP and CRL URLs, and OCSP is AFAICT actually supported by more  
> > clients than AIA CA.
> 
> That is incorrect.  The path validation algorithm checks cryptographic
> correctness and certificate (attribute) validity starting at a trust
> anchor first, and ONLY when that succeeds, CRLs and OCSP is checked.

That's true of path _validation_.  It's not necessarily true of path
_construction_ (see RFC4158).  That is, if you start with an EE cert you
might have to go find the intermediate CA certs.

> So when doing path validation correctly, you never access untrusted
> CRL and OCSP resources.

If you're building a path from the target to the anchor then you'll
probably want to prune paths as soon as possible by validating
intermediate CA certs as soon as possible.

Nico
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