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Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Mon, 22 May 2017 14:50 UTC

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Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 09:50:09 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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References: <CAPZZOTgizE2n06V9wEtARFCXB7FP_eikW-K1k67bZG11kNhSAw@mail.gmail.com> <44AED5C2-B21C-442A-8412-9134D1C10BCD@dukhovni.org> <201705192143.19490.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <20170520054117.GM10188@localhost> <80AB5C55-41BA-471E-A55A-86E98299B652@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13
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On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 01:55:07AM -0400, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> > On May 20, 2017, at 1:41 AM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
> > "When using TLS to authenticate the server, certificate signature
> > algorithms weaker than <list of weakest acceptable signature algs here>
> > MUST NOT be used."
> 
> Minor correction, perhaps you really mean to say "when using RFC5280 (PKIX)
> to authenticate... (the [server or client?]).  TLS is just the transport
> after all.

No, I meant what I said, as in "as opposed to using TLS
opportunistically".

Nico
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