[TLS] User Defined Key Pair
"OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)" <omh1835@rit.edu> Fri, 21 June 2013 18:35 UTC
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Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2013 21:35:29 +0300
From: "OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)" <omh1835@rit.edu>
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Subject: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair
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Hello All, I have uploaded a new version of the User Defined Key pair protocol that is cleaner and briefer, I will appreciate any comments or suggestions. Just to remind you: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-omar-tls-udkp-01 The new protocol is a new way of securing the traffic to websites without being depending on any third party to secure the traffic between the user and the website, so it will be possible for the user to secure his browsing using his credential information, smart card, or a random file on usb. That will make the use of two factor for authentication and traffic security is separated from the application code, the website admin only needs to configure how the users are going to access the website. Additionally there are no passwords required to be transferred any more on the network, which will render the Phishing attack useless. The motivation behind the new protocol is to make the security the responsibility of the two involved parties, because as you know, the security and confidentiality of user browsing in TLS depend upon the number of Certificate Authorities (CAs), major web browsers trust hundreds of different firms to issue certificates. Each of these firms can be compelled by their national government, or being compromised to issue a certificate for any particular website that all web browsers will trust without warning.Thus, users around the world are put in a position where their browser entrusts their private data, indirectly, to a large number of governments, and entities. (http://cryptome.org/ssl-mitm.pdf) Thank You Best Regards
- [TLS] User Defined Key Pair OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Stephan T.
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Juho Vähä-Herttua
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Robert Cragie
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Paras Shah
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Juho Vähä-Herttua
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Juho Vähä-Herttua
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Paras Shah
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair Alex Elsayed
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)
- Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student)