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Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3: Deterministic RSA-PSS and ECDSA

mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Tue, 09 August 2016 14:16 UTC

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To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2016 16:16:15 +0200
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From: mrex@sap.com
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3: Deterministic RSA-PSS and ECDSA
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Tony Arcieri wrote:
[ Charset UTF-8 unsupported, converting... ]
> On Monday, August 8, 2016, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> >
> > The urban myth about the advantages of the RSA-PSS signature scheme
> > over PKCS#1 v1.5 keep coming up.
> 
> Do you think we'll see real-world MitM attacks against RSA-PSS in TLS
> similar to those we've seen with PKCS#1v1.5 signature forgery, such as
> BERserk?

BERserk is an implementation defect, not a crypto weakness.

-Martin

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