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Re: [TLS] Next steps for draft-agl-tls-padding

Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi> Sun, 06 April 2014 21:31 UTC

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Date: Mon, 07 Apr 2014 00:31:14 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Next steps for draft-agl-tls-padding
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On Sun, Apr 06, 2014 at 02:27:38PM -0700, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 6, 2014 at 2:17 PM, Ilari Liusvaara
> <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi> wrote:
> >
> > You mean can't be verifiably closed? Or something else?
> 
> All covert channels can be closed by auditing the software. But if I
> introduce a leak in the nonce bits of ECDSA that is subtle, or encode
> data I want to exfiltrate in the random padding of OAEP, even with the
> private key, I cannot detect this.

Ah, the model is post-hoc auditing with access to private key. Got it.

And yeah, there are EC signature primitives that are deterministic and
auditable in that model (such as Ed25519)...


-Ilari

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