Re: [tsvwg] Review of draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options-32

["[e-mail]" <[e-mail]>]

Hi, all,

> On Apr 9, 2024, at 3:31 AM, Zaheduzzaman Sarker <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> The questions I would like to get answer is  - 
> 
>       Is it OK for the endpoints to send information in UDP options which can be read (only) by the transit nodes and react to it? if NO,  then how to prevent that to happen? 
> 
> //Zahed 

We can prevent that if/when we proceed with the UDP encryption option or using IPsec.

But all this talk about transport protocols and their vulnerability to on-path mods strikes me as hollow. We have had such protections for TCP for a generation (over 25 yrs) with TCP-MD5 and its successor TCP-AO. Neither one protects packets from on-path tampering with IP options, but we’ve had that for just as long too.

What we don’t have is a widely enough deployed key infrastructure. Until that happens, it’s difficult to understand how raising these issues obligates protocol designers.

However, there’s a second point I have not seen raised. Saying these options MUST NOT be modified in transit isn’t just for implementers - it’s also for those seeking to standardize such behavior and for those in the IETF who might assess those standards. What we’re saying, besides “don’t do it”, is “don’t standardize it”.

The doc can make that point more clear in the doc, but I don’t see any other action coming from this discussion for the core doc.

I also would suggest we move these discussions off to GITHUB as soon as possible so we can trace them more easily (chairs - what’s the procedure for that? Do you? Does the doc shepherd? Do I?).

Joe