Re: [Uta] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-17: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Alberto Bertogli <albertito@blitiri.com.ar> Fri, 04 May 2018 14:57 UTC

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Date: Fri, 04 May 2018 15:56:12 +0100
From: Alberto Bertogli <albertito@blitiri.com.ar>
To: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@dukhovni.org>
Cc: uta@ietf.org, draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts@ietf.org, uta-chairs@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Uta] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-17: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Fri, May 04, 2018 at 05:19:46AM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>On Thu, May 03, 2018 at 06:14:44PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> >      2.  That at least one of the policy's "mx" patterns matches at least
>> >          one of the identities presented in the MX's X.509 certificate, as
>> >          described in "MX Certificate Validation".
>>
>> IMPORTANT: This doesn't seem like quite what you want. Consider
>> the case where the STS policy has:
>>
>>    mx: mx1.example.com
>>    mx: mx2.example.com
>>
>> And I then attempt to send to mx1.example.com, send SNI=mx1.example.com,
>> and get a cert that is only valid for mx2.example.com.
>
>[ This was discussed extensively in the WG.  This part of the design
>  is substantially my doing... ]

For ease of reference, these are some of those discussions where people 
(including me) raised concerns about the custom certificate matching:

https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/uta/current/msg02195.html

https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/uta/current/msg01922.html

https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/uta/current/msg02308.html

Thanks,
		Alberto