Re: [Webpush] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-webpush-protocol-11: (with COMMENT)

Spencer Dawkins at IETF <spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com> Wed, 12 October 2016 23:48 UTC

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From: Spencer Dawkins at IETF <spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2016 18:48:22 -0500
Message-ID: <CAKKJt-epvGLfXnsoNi5iogQGhwtf9z2VXoHhFjdicDXYhk7yEQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
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Cc: draft-ietf-webpush-protocol@ietf.org, Shida Schubert <shida@ntt-at.com>, webpush-chairs@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, webpush@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Webpush] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-webpush-protocol-11: (with COMMENT)
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Hi, Ben,

On Oct 12, 2016 17:12, "Ben Campbell" <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
>
> On 12 Oct 2016, at 16:29, Spencer Dawkins at IETF wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Oct 12, 2016 at 4:25 PM, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
>>> draft-ietf-webpush-protocol-11: Yes
>>>
>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>>
>>>
>>> Please refer to
https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>>
>>>
>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-webpush-protocol/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> COMMENT:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> Thanks for a well written document. I have a few questions on one topic,
>>> for which the answers may be obvious to people other than me:
>>>
>>> In section 8, 2nd paragraph: "Applications using this protocol MUST use
>>> mechanisms that provide
>>>    confidentiality, integrity and data origin authentication."
>>>
>>> What must it use those mechanisms for? Are we talking about
communication
>>> between the UA and app servers? Are we just talking about data in
motion?
>>>  As much as I like to see such requirements in general, is it reasonable
>>> for webpush to state requirements on the internal operation of the
>>> application?
>>>
>>
>> For what it's worth, I didn't understand whether the mandatory HTTP over
>> TLS (right?) satisfies this MUST, or whether it meant something
completely
>> different.
>>
>
> Ah, right, I guess it could mean that. I assumed that it was talking
about something not already covered by the other TLS requirements.

Yeah, I was kinda guessing, too :-)

>> So I'm also curious about Ben's comment.
>
>
>