Re: [Acme] High level comments on draft-barnes-acme (the GitHub version)

[Bernd Eckenfels <[e-mail]>]

DVSNI has the same protection level than cleartext tokens (or
challenge emails). It is an opportunistic way of automatically verifying
the domain. I dont think the TLS part in there is meant to add any
protection (how should it, if the cert is not trusted).

Besides scanning from different locations to reduce the risk and of
course not using the method when the idendity is already protected with
a key there is not much ACME can do in a automated CA scenario.

This is pretty similiar to SSH's TOFU.

Having said that I was quite suprised that a new method was suggested.
It IMHO mainly adds bloat.

Gruss
Bernd

Am Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:27 -0500
schrieb Joseph Lorenzo Hall <[e-mail]>:

> On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 2:42 PM, John Mattsson
> <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 25 Mar 2015, at 13:24, Jonathan Rudenberg
> > <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Mar 25, 2015, at 9:35 AM, John Mattsson
> > <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > Some high level comments on draft-barnes-acme (the GitHub version)
> >
> >
> > - Security:
> > The security of this seems to need some serious rethinking. The
> > “Domain Validation with Server Name Indication” challenge seems
> > totally nonsecure, allowing ANY on-path attacker to get
> > certificates issued. I think this challenge is unacceptable for
> > certificate issuance and I think it should be removed. Just because
> > I let Amazon, Microsoft, Google or any other cloud provider run my
> > web server does not mean I give them the right to request
> > certificates for my domain.
> >
> >
> > Thanks for pointing this out.
> 
> This seems like a big deal, no? That is, since SNI is one of the few
> things not protected in the TLS handshake, it does seem spoofable. If
> there's not something I'm missing, it seems like the proposal should
> just drop DVSNI altogether.
>