Re: [Acme] High level comments on draft-barnes-acme (the GitHub version)

Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> Thu, 26 March 2015 16:01 UTC

Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: acme@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: acme@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D1A9C1A8783 for <acme@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 26 Mar 2015 09:01:21 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.278
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.278 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id POEmOraIe_Ce for <acme@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 26 Mar 2015 09:01:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-lb0-x230.google.com (mail-lb0-x230.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4010:c04::230]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 991831A87AF for <acme@ietf.org>; Thu, 26 Mar 2015 09:01:15 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by lbbug6 with SMTP id ug6so44357797lbb.3 for <acme@ietf.org>; Thu, 26 Mar 2015 09:01:14 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject :from:to:cc:content-type; bh=/Tf8IvGi3yzMEJjcDsI72IT3KOgHvq/FEesy3paVs0o=; b=ZD26zrnC01v/S86rbfQGeIeEX0oXs0enDlfDt7oGHYMrCrCslekQskSEjt1sIWMWAB UwnvK2yho6nAhvdjSxNQLySDvwtukEASTKMMf2Yc0RPb8Zxx64S9v0gVkjuZo4CJz8uA c34gQjdFoD/bX/DOUK0wPWesuXxkoflqgdcqGw/hftUCsCd3Hnrkz41BJDUNzkQzVYdd rr/af/b/j52x4eDJNHFL4WlCy0IuE0OX+mZV/KSJckVdIKj6lMvI4qUpEa9+xJJ7zsgH aOBZBTgxw4ycuMYWr4fDnhM/kQQdHoOH/tAaJoA/EQB7O9Vq7PdXEp/TU3jNXZbh+fFT aZQg==
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.152.42.141 with SMTP id o13mr7025999lal.79.1427385674114; Thu, 26 Mar 2015 09:01:14 -0700 (PDT)
Sender: hallam@gmail.com
Received: by 10.112.45.203 with HTTP; Thu, 26 Mar 2015 09:01:13 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <CABkgnnUjiNymD0PmmWALBwXq2CaCuSFsnDwRqGA7JVmpgUtqjw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <92B826AA-48E3-454C-85A9-600F84D539DD@ericsson.com> <9F77199A-98B7-4963-8EA3-552405B5342F@titanous.com> <B4953448-093A-4DB7-B81D-B09FE31E7B3F@ericsson.com> <CABtrr-V4++ayD4UV32maWiOSLyg=r3Gj-HNnDaizQ_WoF_4PjQ@mail.gmail.com> <551334F9.9040107@eff.org> <CABkgnnUjiNymD0PmmWALBwXq2CaCuSFsnDwRqGA7JVmpgUtqjw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 11:01:13 -0500
X-Google-Sender-Auth: 8uwaRkX3TQpQLVJe27JOAGrPB4o
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwhGxbZsyzeAt9TWpdovFvS4zp1Y=bU6KeKNHHawUx8V2w@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/acme/VYVnSyG5H2sB8-9TH1X1nY61QrQ>
Cc: Jonathan Rudenberg <jonathan@titanous.com>, "acme@ietf.org" <acme@ietf.org>, Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <jsha@eff.org>, Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org>, John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [Acme] High level comments on draft-barnes-acme (the GitHub version)
X-BeenThere: acme@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Automated Certificate Management Environment <acme.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/acme>, <mailto:acme-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/acme/>
List-Post: <mailto:acme@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:acme-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme>, <mailto:acme-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 16:01:22 -0000

On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 10:40 AM, Martin Thomson
<martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 25 March 2015 at 17:21, Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <jsha@eff.org> wrote:
>>> This seems like a big deal, no? That is, since SNI is one of the few
>> things not protected in the TLS handshake, it does seem spoofable. If
>> there's not something I'm missing, it seems like the proposal should
>> just drop DVSNI altogether.
>>
>> An attacker who fully controls the network is explicitly not part of the
>> threat model for any Domain Validation. None of the available techniques
>> for DV, whether they involve fetching a file, sending an email, or doing
>> a TLS handshake can fully mitigate a network attacker.
>
> It has been suggested that some measure of network control can be
> mitigated by originating the validation requests from multiple network
> locations.  That would be down to CA policy though.

It is called 'running a CA'.

That type of conversation is best left to CABForum and discussions
with your friendly neighborhood auditors.