Re: [Anima] Is this how BRSKI/IPIP works?

Michael Richardson <> Fri, 14 July 2017 23:01 UTC

Return-Path: <>
Received: from localhost (localhost []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id B1630127444 for <>; Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:01:52 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.901
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.901 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from ([]) by localhost ( []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vo1nkBbQooBl for <>; Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:01:51 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ( [IPv6:2a01:7e00::f03c:91ff:feae:de77]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2DC2F126DD9 for <>; Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:01:51 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ( []) by (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0C59A1F8FB; Fri, 14 Jul 2017 23:01:50 +0000 (UTC)
Received: by (Postfix, from userid 179) id 3EA4B27F8; Sat, 15 Jul 2017 01:01:47 +0200 (CEST)
From: Michael Richardson <>
To: Brian E Carpenter <>
cc: Eliot Lear <>, Toerless Eckert <>, Anima WG <>
In-reply-to: <>
References: <> <> <> <> <> <> <>
Comments: In-reply-to Brian E Carpenter <> message dated "Sat, 15 Jul 2017 08:14:04 +1200."
X-Mailer: MH-E 8.6; nmh 1.6; GNU Emacs 24.5.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg="pgp-sha1"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"
Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 01:01:47 +0200
Message-ID: <>
Archived-At: <>
Subject: Re: [Anima] Is this how BRSKI/IPIP works?
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: Autonomic Networking Integrated Model and Approach <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 23:01:52 -0000

Brian E Carpenter <> wrote:
    > But On 14/07/2017 18:13, Eliot Lear wrote: ...
    >> I made my comment in the context of a possible interface collision in
    >> your diagram.  Those had to do with the autonomic nodes, not the
    >> proxies, as I understand things.  To avoid those sorts of collisions,
    >> it seems like using the h/w address remains sensible.  A collision in
    >> those circumstances would be extremely unlikely, whereas relying on
    >> poor PRNG almost assures it of happening.  These devices are likely to
    >> have very little entropy available to them.

    > And they may well be BRSKI pledges, just not using GRASP for discovery.
    > So Eliot's point seems valid (but not an issue for ANIMA alone).

7217 says:
RID = F(Prefix, Net_Iface, Network_ID, DAD_Counter, secret_key)

only the secret_key is really unique, and perhaps that's what you are
worrying about?

          A secret key that is not known by the attacker.  The secret
          key SHOULD be of at least 128 bits.  It MUST be initialized to
          a pseudo-random number (see [RFC4086] for randomness
          requirements for security) when the operating system is
          installed or when the IPv6 protocol stack is "bootstrapped"
          for the first time.

As the secret_key should be generated when the system is "installed"
or "first bootstrapped", I'm not sure the PRNG quality at runtime.
It seems to me like the secret_key should be set at manufacturer time
on the "bed-of-nails" or other JTAG point, at the same time when the
BRSKI IDevID and (perhaps) MASA anchors are loaded.   If those things
are in a TPM, then the secret_key could be there too.

]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [ 
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect  [ 
]        |   ruby on rails    [