Re: [Anima] Is this how BRSKI/IPIP works?

[Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>]

Brian E Carpenter <[e-mail]> wrote:
    > But On 14/07/2017 18:13, Eliot Lear wrote: ...
    >> I made my comment in the context of a possible interface collision in
    >> your diagram.  Those had to do with the autonomic nodes, not the
    >> proxies, as I understand things.  To avoid those sorts of collisions,
    >> it seems like using the h/w address remains sensible.  A collision in
    >> those circumstances would be extremely unlikely, whereas relying on
    >> poor PRNG almost assures it of happening.  These devices are likely to
    >> have very little entropy available to them.

    > And they may well be BRSKI pledges, just not using GRASP for discovery.
    > So Eliot's point seems valid (but not an issue for ANIMA alone).

7217 says:
RID = F(Prefix, Net_Iface, Network_ID, DAD_Counter, secret_key)

only the secret_key is really unique, and perhaps that's what you are
worrying about?

secret_key:
          A secret key that is not known by the attacker.  The secret
          key SHOULD be of at least 128 bits.  It MUST be initialized to
          a pseudo-random number (see [RFC4086] for randomness
          requirements for security) when the operating system is
          installed or when the IPv6 protocol stack is "bootstrapped"
          for the first time.

As the secret_key should be generated when the system is "installed"
or "first bootstrapped", I'm not sure the PRNG quality at runtime.
It seems to me like the secret_key should be set at manufacturer time
on the "bed-of-nails" or other JTAG point, at the same time when the
BRSKI IDevID and (perhaps) MASA anchors are loaded.   If those things
are in a TPM, then the secret_key could be there too.

-- 
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [ 
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect  [ 
]     [e-mail]  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [