Re: [Anima] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-28: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Michael Richardson <> Tue, 29 October 2019 16:09 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <>
To: Eliot Lear <>
cc: Benjamin Kaduk <>,,,, The IESG <>,
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Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 12:09:40 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-28: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Eliot Lear <> wrote:
    >> I mean, we literally say "Reducing the possibility of this is why the
    >> pledge is mandated to generate a strong random or pseudo-random number
    >> nonce."  So to also say "the nonce [...] does not require a strong
    >> cryptographic randomness" seems to be in conflict with the former
    >> statement.
    >> Are you saying that "strong random" and "strong cryptographic random" mean
    >> different things, or am I misreading the document in some other way?

    > I would just drop the statement.  The whole point of the nonce is to
    > prevent replay attacks, so why would we want to weaken that?

I don't want someone to think that they need to include an additional
source of hardware entropy just for the nonce.  They already need a well
seeded PRNG (RFC4086) for TLS operation, and that's more than enough.

Michael Richardson <>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-