Re: [apps-discuss] HTTP MAC Authentication Scheme

Chris Bentzel <chris@bentzel.net> Tue, 10 May 2011 01:00 UTC

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Date: Mon, 9 May 2011 21:00:02 -0400
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From: Chris Bentzel <chris@bentzel.net>
To: apps-discuss@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [apps-discuss] HTTP MAC Authentication Scheme
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On Mon, May 9, 2011 at 3:22 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>wrote;wrote:

> (Please discuss this draft on the Apps-Discuss <apps-discuss@ietf.org>
> mailing list)
>

Should there be support for more headers in the Normalized Request String
[Section 3.3.1] to minimize MITM attacks? Could this be done on all
non-hop-by-hop headers? One concern is reordering of headers by
middle-boxes.

Should the body hash be a separate header from the Authorization header?
This may allow a User-Agent to do a Chunked-Encoding POST with a trailing
header containing the body hash, preventing the need to buffer all of the
body in the User-Agent before sending over the wire. However, it would lead
to some duplication of the parameters included in the Authorization header.