Re: [Cfrg] Curve manipulation, revisited

[Adam Langley <[e-mail]>]

On Mon, Dec 29, 2014 at 7:57 AM, Benjamin Black <[e-mail]> wrote:
> It seems performance is the real priority here and you will happily discard
> things you insist are necessary for security when they conflict with
> performance. At the 128-bit security level the ladder can be faster. At the
> 200-bit+ security levels the ladder is slower. Should we blame the
> implementor who elects not to use a single-coordinate ladder? Should we
> wonder why you would choose not to eliminate these security failures?

Montgomery ladders allow for very simple, robust implementations of
scalar-mult. Sometimes an implementation might want to trade off cache
pressure for speed, but certainly not all will. If we accept that
supporting Montgomery ladders is a requirement, then we can easily
meet that by sending the Montgomery-x value in ECDH protocols because
windowed methods can easily output this. Thus these are not in
conflict.

(An implementation that wants to use a windowed method with a
Montgomery-X *input* will need to perform a square-root first, but
that's the same cost as a design where compressed Edwards points are
sent. Note: smarter people than I might be able to eliminate the
square-root but I don't see it)

> This section of your paper raises another interesting point. It seems a
> slight performance drop in exchange for consuming less SRAM can be a
> desirable property to you. In Adam's Faster Curve25519 post
> (https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/05/10/fastercurve25519.html), he
> achieves significant performance improvements at a cost of 24KB of cache for
> tables.

Keep in mind that this was mostly the result of me needing to explain
windowed methods to someone. The practical benefit to ECDH systems is
minimal since the base-point multiplication can be amortised. (Fast
signatures, however, obviously can benefit, but there's no danger of
an invalid-curve attack when multiplying by the base point.)

> I'm not sure what point you are trying to make here. The people who haven't
> submitted curves should remain silent? That is antithetical to the IETF
> process.

I think Tanja is commenting on the fact that the IETF process is alien
to most cryptographers. Cryptographers often run competitions (e.g.
the AES and SHA-3 competitions) where teams submit candidates and a
winner is decided. That's very different to the more "collaborative"
method common at the IETF.


Cheers

AGL