Re: [dane] On the PKIX-TA / PKIX-CA question? [ One week WGLC ]

Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org> Thu, 05 December 2013 17:53 UTC

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Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2013 17:53:14 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org>
To: dane@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [dane] On the PKIX-TA / PKIX-CA question? [ One week WGLC ]
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The sample size of responses seems too small to reach a meaningful
consensus.

Perhaps posting something a bit more controversial will get the
silent majority to speak up. :-)  To wit:

    - Assign explanatory names only to usages 2 and 3:

	2 - TRUST-ANCHOR
	3 - END-ENTITY

    - Since usages 0/1 merely complicate DANE implementation without[*]
      enhancing security, they can remain anonymous, or be given names
      that clearly indicate that these are discouraged/deprecated.

	0 - SECURITY-THEATRE-0
	1 - SECURITY-THEATRE-1

This would remove all confusion about the DANE usages.  If someone
can justify the existence of 0 and 1 in a pair of pithy acronyms
then those are the names.  Otherwise, out they go!

[ I have begun design/implementation of general-purpose DANE support
  for OpenSSL.  Supporting all four usages is rather more complex
  than one might imagine, and is largely wasted effort, but the
  protocol requires 0/1 for now, so I have no choice.  I would be
  thrilled to bits were the above to be taken seriously, and usages
  0/1 dropped from DANE TLSA in a future revision of the protocol. ]

-- 
	Viktor.

*  If DNSSEC *is not* compromised, 2/3 are sufficient.

   If DNSSEC *is* compromised, the attacker will publish 2/3, thus
   a domain owner's use of 0/1 offers no protection against DNS attacks.

   There will be no measurable deployment of out-of-band mechanisms
   that harden 0/1 or application protocols that implement DANE, with
   just usages 0 and 1.