Re: [dns-privacy] Alternative signalling propsals

Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> Tue, 18 December 2018 12:36 UTC

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Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 12:36:32 +0000
From: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
To: Wes Hardaker <wes@hardakers.net>
cc: "Reed, Jon" <jreed@akamai.com>, "dns-privacy@ietf.org" <dns-privacy@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] Alternative signalling propsals
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Wes Hardaker <wes@hardakers.net> wrote:
>
> My list for putting a TLSA or similar record at the reverse zone
> include:
>
> pros:
> - the authoritative server more likely in control of its reverse zone than all
>   the forward zones its serving

Reverse zones plural (v4 + v6) :-)

> - the number of reverse zone records to update on a key change is 1 per ip
>   address.  The number of name server NS records to update per key
>   change is 1 per zone supported, which is very very large for some
>   servers.

For forward DNS it is 1 per name server name (i.e. per alias), which might
be 1 per zone for places that provision zones with in in-bailiwick name
server names, or might be 1 per server if they prefer to provision zones
with canonical name server names.

> - it feels cleaner

> cons:
> - not everyone controls their reverse zone easily, especially for those
>   that don't hold at least a /24 allocation. Ironically, I fall into
>   this camp but still think this is a better solution than a name-based one.
> - requires more lookups
> - requires the reverse tree for that address be fully signed

The "more lookups" thing is interesting.

If the TLSA-like record is in the forward DNS, then you get into a
bootstrapping problem. Assuming we can't add these new records as glue,
a resolver ends up having to:

* query a parent server for delegation; receive NS records and glue
* query a child server publicly for TLSA-like record(s)
* query child server privately for actual question

i.e. in the DNS case we lose the opportunity for concurrent address + TLSA
queries that DANE normally offers.

If the TLSA-like record is in the reverse DNS, and the reverse DNS
nameservers are cached, then the sequence of lookups is the same. The
"more lookups" case happens when there's a cold reverse DNS cache as well
as a cold forward cache.

Putting TLSA-like records in the reverse DNS doesn't solve the bootstrap
problem, in cases where the server you want the TLSA-like record for is
authoritative for its own reverse zones.

I started a thread discussing related things back in September...

https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dns-privacy/current/msg02124.html

Tony.
-- 
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