Re: [DNSOP] WGLC for draft-ietf-dnsop-let-localhost-be-localhost-02

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Fri, 26 January 2018 03:18 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] WGLC for draft-ietf-dnsop-let-localhost-be-localhost-02
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On Jan 25, 2018, at 8:37 PM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> wrote:
> I showed examples, of uses of "localhost".  Some use the TLD itself
> for the usual local IPs, others employ subdomains of "localhost"
> as a sensibly convenient place to park "for my eyes only" local
> DNS data.  These examples are not exhaustive.

That's not what I'm getting at.   What I'm getting at is that you are a consenting adult, and you are using localhost as a hack.   What you are doing is not the right way to do the hack—it's the expedient way to do the hack.   The right way to do the hack is with a real domain name.   You could for example use .homenet or something like it to address the problem.   Localhost is just a convenient top-level domain that you know you can safely use.

If it were the case that some end user who is not a consenting adult were going to have a problem as a result of this text, then I think that would be something we'd need to consider.   But in this case there's no problem.   If you want to do the hack, do the hack.   It's a hack.   It wasn't kosher to begin with, and this doesn't make it any less kosher.

> I also note that the draft does not adequately discuss what to do
> with queries with the DO bit set[1].  Presumably a forged NXDOMAIN
> without appropriate root-zone NSEC records may not be adequate in
> that case.  It probably (my opionion) makes more sense to obtain,
> and cache the NSEC and RRSIG records from the root servers, than
> to return a "bogus" reply.

The draft already addresses the DNSSEC use case.   What is the failure mode that you are concerned about here?   What would go wrong?