Re: [Dots] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-20

Daniel Migault <> Wed, 13 May 2020 03:26 UTC

Return-Path: <>
Received: from localhost (localhost []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4F5C23A0D18; Tue, 12 May 2020 20:26:25 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.097
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.097 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key)
Received: from ([]) by localhost ( []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xVEmr2UfYPDZ; Tue, 12 May 2020 20:26:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ( [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::e34]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 130AE3A07C2; Tue, 12 May 2020 20:26:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by with SMTP id e10so9205380vsp.12; Tue, 12 May 2020 20:26:23 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=FPN5rPKvbc1eh4WOaRabC1HOepv2ChzBb4ff/eQ7HL4=; b=e2Uo6sAOKB0scq8rsNu3mIEx8lB1z2h92GdmMSY2tA03AydrX34yyxW0OOPOPD+pzr fIOmq1olZj44hljQ/1KfXXmncH1nQNN3/3sJyWNOrA5trLIGTOQcSdhb5V6fjZDxPlaj SJdKMfPortGRKqqLarOu1DciyiOtcmqplg07KTZTTkcoMM6/lCZXfljAs7L1dUFpwyod 9Ftk5EZklwZ1denehu4J+Ls6Fhcny+kt74lcFsu2lniI0MDVY+OfR92H76AT2HjJUNic AZSvOixG7Mpxt/IgwKTXiglD6bQpt9lfcrL0NJ2TXUuopMuv4Dc25iQ/RNwWbYvTIB6Z iBhA==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=FPN5rPKvbc1eh4WOaRabC1HOepv2ChzBb4ff/eQ7HL4=; b=Hki/1jksdCN+EU7Nfuxp/u3X0oBc+rtv1YI++3sZXTRrEIGna6YdaRbBKps3SADyJM 1i2Cg2aV3BmEoA684gTrTRwmBP9cKq4CJ+awJXUioBh17lk0zs3JEde8L/I+kiXz85+Z Iypg+BR3bD/seZ1eWmOBN51+Fn7BpANjjhx3MSuNyi6gpMsYbBLRvyUQfm/L25mKYHK4 mmPExw9ctEKK3wGe61pVpRxnlxGiKXHHYNBhQLFgWxQibGwrVTGAWuz5CUoj3J0JOFSA +PNZBb8blpvy5SFCwBrxT1Pj0Q+ZLsd1IVVcORVc7Hs0VcVhwtVu8rcSNDUYzfeA7PLx CcmQ==
X-Gm-Message-State: AGi0PuYZQUQc4/RuBrk+92AXezArrHpm+0kfZUo3iFBWis92knAsxv+P EWue9boCFqEOourC7EZV0cnkmsFBILPSDo6MRpA=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: APiQypKy1UwCx4lsdxJV1My6Mja8hv+7D86bNdTQ3vrKqLhv2rLCDFCN12Wkn1/2xKhBH3e2qp36oX5CRYiopFM9mRw=
X-Received: by 2002:a67:2e01:: with SMTP id u1mr17241395vsu.31.1589340381776; Tue, 12 May 2020 20:26:21 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <>
In-Reply-To: <>
From: Daniel Migault <>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 23:26:11 -0400
Message-ID: <>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <>
Cc:, dots <>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000e210cc05a57f24ef"
Archived-At: <>
Subject: Re: [Dots] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-20
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "List for discussion of DDoS Open Threat Signaling \(DOTS\) technology and directions." <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 03:26:25 -0000

Hi Ben,

Thank you for the comments. I merge your pull request and will go through
the comments in the email in the next two days.


On Tue, May 12, 2020 at 4:22 PM Benjamin Kaduk <> wrote:

> Hi all,
> This one is in pretty good shape -- I don't have any major comments on it.
> I did write up some editorial nit-level stuff as a github pull request:
> .  I think that nothing
> there should be controversial, but please let me know if I am wrong about
> that.
> Please confirm that all six authors made significant contributions: I
> will need to defend this to the rest of the IESG, since per RFC 7322 the
> author count is generally limited to five individuals.  Right now I don't
> have a good response when someone asks.
> Section 1
>    As DDoS solutions are broadly heterogeneous among vendors, the
>    primary goal of DOTS is to provide high-level interaction amongst
>    differing DDoS solutions, such as detecting, initiating, terminating
>    DDoS mitigation assistance or requesting the status of a DDoS
>    mitigation.
> nit: the list structure is not properly parallel.  It looks like the
> various clauses are meant to be "detecting DDoS",
> "initiating/terminating mitigation assistance", and "requesting
> mitigation status", so maybe this could become:
> % As DDoS solutions are broadly heterogeneous among vendors, the
> % primary goal of DOTS is to provide high-level interaction amongst
> % differing DDoS solutions, such as detecting DDoS attacks,
> % initiating/terminating DDoS mitigation assistance, or requesting the
> % status of a DDoS mitigation.
> Section 3.1
>    Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server of the ITP
>    periodically informs the DOTS client on the enterprise DMS mitigation
>    status, statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and
>    related information.  Once the DDoS attack has ended, or decreased to
>    the certain level that the enterprise DMS can handle by itself, the
>    DOTS server signals the enterprise DMS DOTS client that the attack
>    has subsided.
> It's interesting that this is worded in such a way that the (ITP) DOTS
> server knows the specific threshold for what level of attack traffic the
> enterprise DMS can handle, since it's the DOTS server signalling to the
> client that "the attack has subsided".
> Section 3.3
>    Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the DDoS telemetry
>    system, the orchestrator DOTS server responds with an acknowledgment,
>    to avoid retransmission of the request for mitigation.  The
>    orchestrator may begin collecting additional fine-grained and
>    specific information from various DDoS telemetry systems in order to
>    correlate the measurements and provide an analysis of the event.
>    Eventually, the orchestrator may ask for additional information from
>    the DDoS telemetry system; however, the collection of this
>    information is out of scope.
> The last sentence seems to say that how the orchestrator gets data from
> the initial DOTS client telemtry system is out-of-scope, but the
> previous sentence talks about the orchestrator collecting information
> from (other) DOTS telemetry systems.  Is that similarly out of scope?
> If so, then the fact that they are specifically *DOTS* telemetry systems
> seems irrelevant and we should probably just describe them as generic
> telemetry or monitoring systems.
>    Upon receiving a request to mitigate a DDoS attack performed over a
>    target, the orchestrator may evaluate the volumetry of the attack as
> nit(?): is "performed over" a conventional usage?  I would have expected
> something more like "aimed at" given my personal background, but could
> just be ignorant of typical usage.
> Also, I think "volumetry" is not the right word here, and just "volume"
> suffices.
>    filter the traffic.  In this case, the DDoS mitigation system
>    implements a DOTS client while the orchestrator implements a DOTS
>    server.  Similar to other DOTS use cases, the offloading scenario
>    assumes that some validation checks are followed by the DMS, the
>    orchestrator, or both (e.g., avoid exhausting the resources of the
>    forwarding nodes or disrupting the service).  These validation checks
>    are part of the mitigation, and are therefore out of the scope of the
>    document.
> I know we added this last chunk of text after a long exchange during the
> last WGLC, and understand the desire to avoid going into too many
> details on a topic that is mostly out of scope for DOTS.  That said, I'd
> suggest adding a couple more words around "disrupting the service"
> (especially since some level of service disruption during an attack
> might be expected!) to help the reader make the link to what kind of
> validation is expected, perhaps something like "inadvertent disruption
> of legitimate services".
> Section 4
> In light of my previous comment I don't want to go too far here, but I
> could see it being relevant to have a note that in the "orchestration"
> case it's possible for something that locally to one telemetry system
> looks like an attack is not actually an attack when seen from the
> broader scope (e.g., of the orchestrator).
> In the Third Party MSP case we mention BGP as a way to steer traffic to
> the mitigation service.  We could consider (but don't have to)
> mentioning that efforts to secure BGP will need to be considered when
> making pre-arrangements for how traffic is to be moved, since in some
> contexts such BGP announcements could themselves be considered to be an
> attack.
> I guess it probably goes without saying that when you add a third-party
> DMS to your setup, you depend on that third party to be operational in
> order for your setup to work properly.
> Section 7
> We'll probably get someone asking to move RFC 8612 to be a Normative
> reference since we use it for terminology, but I don't mind leaving it
> be for now.
> Thanks,
> Ben
> _______________________________________________
> Dots mailing list

Daniel Migault