Re: [Emu] review of draft-ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req-04

Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com> Thu, 04 March 2010 06:47 UTC

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Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2010 07:47:22 +0100
From: Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com>
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To: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf@checkpoint.com>
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Cc: "emu@ietf.org" <emu@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Emu] review of draft-ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req-04
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Yaron Sheffer wrote:
> Joe, what Dan is proposing is a reasonable way to use a one-time password for the initial provisioning of a trust anchor. Initial provisioning is important for many types of deployments. Does the document allow an alternative secure way to do that?

  TLS-based methods can leverage server certificates.  This is already
done in other areas (WiMAX, etc.)

  i.e. ship a device with a known CA, and on first provisioning, TLS
checks the server certificate, and the user validates that the name of
the server is what was expected.

  Since the document doesn't forbid anonymous methods, the only issue
here is whether or not the document should make them mandatory to
implement.  I agree with Joe, in that they shouldn't be mandatory.

  Alan DeKok.