Re: [Ietf-http-auth] Request for review and consensus -- draft-hartman-webauth-phishing
Tom Yu <tlyu@MIT.EDU> Tue, 09 September 2008 16:01 UTC
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To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [Ietf-http-auth] Request for review and consensus -- draft-hartman-webauth-phishing
References: <47490048-25ED-403E-96B9-0D385F764292@osafoundation.org> <6.2.5.6.2.20080908104107.02d68650@resistor.net> <tsltzcqxzjb.fsf@mit.edu> <6.2.5.6.2.20080908125602.02bb9ab8@resistor.net> <tsl8wu1tqp4.fsf@mit.edu>
From: Tom Yu <tlyu@MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2008 12:01:09 -0400
In-Reply-To: <tsl8wu1tqp4.fsf@mit.edu> (Sam Hartman's message of "Tue, 09 Sep 2008 09:05:27 -0400")
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Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@MIT.EDU> writes: >>>>>> "SM" == SM <sm@resistor.net> writes: > > SM> Quoting a sentence from Section 3: > > SM> "We assume that users have limited motivation to combat > SM> phishing." > > Would you be happier with "We assume that users are interested in > combatting phishing, but cannot be expected to learn the details of > security protocols, certification practices, and the like." I think your proposed change above is largely redundant with the rest of the paragraph that follows it in the I-D. I think it is more useful to say: "We assume that users wish to protect themselves, but are willing to expend only limited effort to combat phishing; they will avoid an interface if they find it too complicated. This can result in the user preferring a simpler insecure interface to a more complex but more secure one. Alternatively, a user more fully informed of the risks may abandon any effort to access a service if the choice is between using a complex, secure interface and using a simple but known-to-be-insecure interface." I know that my suggested text should be condensed more, but I'm trying to see if that more effectively conveys the intended meaning. The paragraph in its original form appears to encompass two related concepts: * We cannot expect users to be security experts. * We cannot expect users to expend significant effort to protect themselves against risks they only poorly understand. A complex interface that requires the user to make a security judgment is doubly flawed, in my opinion, but this appears to be the experience of Web browsing today.
- Re: [Ietf-http-auth] Request for review and conse… SM
- Re: [Ietf-http-auth] Request for review and conse… Chris Newman
- Re: [Ietf-http-auth] Request for review and conse… Tom Yu
- Re: [Ietf-http-auth] Request for review and conse… SM
- [Ietf-http-auth] Assumptions about user motivatio… Sam Hartman
- Re: [Ietf-http-auth] Request for review and conse… Tom Yu
- Re: [Ietf-http-auth] Request for review and conse… Sam Hartman
- [Ietf-http-auth] Re: Request for review and conse… Sam Hartman
- Re: [Ietf-http-auth] Request for review and conse… SM
- Re: [Ietf-http-auth] Request for review and conse… Sam Hartman
- Re: [Ietf-http-auth] Request for review and conse… SM
- [Ietf-http-auth] Re: Request for review and conse… Simon Josefsson
- [Ietf-http-auth] [Peter Gutmann] Re: [saag] Reque… Sam Hartman
- Re: [saag] Request for review and consensus -- dr… Peter Gutmann
- [Ietf-http-auth] Request for review and consensus… Lisa Dusseault